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Papa Abel Remembers — The Tale of A Band of
Booksellers, Fasicle 15: Competition!
by Richard Abel (Aged Independent Learner) <reabel@q.com>

W

e Argonauts had become hardened
by and adroit at dealing with competition by the late 1960s. We had
afterall put out there in the open marketplace
of ideas our Approval Plan, with the complete
specifications for the ways to effectively reduce
the cost of getting books responsive to the differing collecting interests of scholarly/research
libraries and getting them into these libraries
upon publication to better serve the needs of
their users. We had integrated the differing
decisions respecting the need for receiving/not
receiving books in all classes of series into the
Approval Plan (books bearing some sort of
series identification represented roughly 40%
of all scholarly books published).
We had created a nearly worldwide system
for the provision of virtually all the scholarly
books published in the then scholarly languages of the world to academic/research libraries
in most of the then major teaching/research
nations of the world. (It might be said that we
were at the leading edge of what is now styled
“globalization.”) This integrated acquisition
system permitted us to provide libraries with
books well beyond those published in their
particular countries, extending their collecting
scope to those published in other countries.
The bibliographic information relating to
and identifying this vast array of book writings in a variety of languages was all readily available in the massive computer files
growing out of the Approval Plan. We had
developed a computer-based cataloging system
incorporating not only Library of Congress
cataloging records but also those generated by
the firm for libraries unwilling to wait for the
arrival of L.C. cataloging, and cataloging for
the backlist titles derived from the supply of
both turn-key undergraduate collections and
turn-key opening-day collections for newly
established libraries. This extensive and growing cataloging database was all in our computer
and readily available as card set, microfiche,
and/or computer tape outputs.
We had developed first the bibliographies
for both classes of turnkey libraries (undergraduate and opening day collections) and
then a sophisticated computer-based system
for selecting books for both the latter de novo
species of libraries and then for generating the
orders to fulfill the book requirements, and
finally to provide them fully-cataloged and
processed with the requisite property indicators, circulation pockets/cards, shelf labels,
etc., for shelf-ready use. All of these flexible,
“mix & match” services were, as noted above,
readily and fully-knowable in the public square
of ideas.
In putting all this large body of interrelated
ideas out into the public square we well understood that imitators would quickly latch onto
them and fashion various replicas of them.
We also believed, a belief later confirmed in
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fact, that they would do so in a cheapened,
watered-down fashion, as none seemed to
be as driven by the imperative of advancing
scholarly knowledge as were we — all of us
bookmen. We also understood from our years
in the scholarly book trade that the first line of
attack of competitors touting their Approval
Plans and other copies of our systems would
be price, just as it had been for all the earlier
years of our experience. They were not fundamentally committed to full service, which
had governed our firm’s policies and practices
from its inception. Such a marketing strategy
mounted by competitors manifestly entailed a
cheapening of the quality and extent of service
being offered. So, we were well-prepared to
deal progressively with what we were convinced would be the shape of the private sector
competitive environment in which we lived.
But suddenly out of the blue a quite
unexpected competitor appeared. The
very nature of this new competitor was
highly problematic. It was a creature
far different than anything with
which we had coped
for years. It was created out of munificent
financial support from
its opening and supported by continuing
subventions along the
way. It was obliged
to incur few of the
costs for space, support utilities, taxes, or
the enormous financial
commitments to computer hardware attending
the private sector. It was given all manner
of software that merely required integration,
not the staggering costs of designing, programming, and debugging the programs then
required by the hardware available. Quite why
it ever came into being escaped our understanding. How to deal with it while still maintaining
the vitality and financial well-being of our firm
and our staff was equally beyond immediate
reckoning.
As described earlier, and as feared in trying to decipher the meaning of the behavior
of the Federal contingent and the single ARL
Librarian, all three of whom refused to take
a seat at that meeting but remained fixed at
the door in that riotous 1967 lunch meeting
we had mounted for the ARL Librarians at
an ALA meeting in Washington, some other
still undisclosed initiative was in the wings.
We had planned that meeting as a solicitation
to participate in a program aimed at making
cataloging for overseas books available much
more quickly, little expecting neither the outburst of criticism aimed at the L.C. contingent
nor their refusal to overtly join the meeting. We
learned soon enough that the recently-formed
Council for Library Resources would fund

this unheralded move in large measure. The
Ford Foundation, which funded the CLR,
had declared its interest in providing a model
for libraries to guide future development of a
computer-based system for libraries. The first
initiative in 1966 involved a large grant to MIT
for the development of such a model system.
That effort proved largely fruitless — only a
few working modules were developed. In due
course we next learned that a new corporate
entity was to be launched and to be known by
its initials-based acronym, OCLC. OCLC
then developed and was housed in space provided by Ohio State University Library and
was to use a mainframe computer provided
by OSU Library. The initial purpose of this
new not-for-profit was conceived to be the
central, national online cataloging center.
Participating library demand quickly diverted
from this objective to that of conforming to practicing library needs for the
supply of L.C. catalog card sets as well
as “shared cataloging” card sets.
The organization started with
the generous funding of
CLR plus membership
dues. OCLC continued to receive subventions from a variety
of sources as well as
revenues from sales
of card sets. Several
library-developed software programs were
donated. So, the “new
kid on the block” was
not only well and continuously funded and
enjoyed two streams of steady income but
also benefited from free or very inexpensive
facilities and operational support.
Not long after learning of the nature of this
new and novel creature, several librarians who
had been acquiring cataloging from us shifted
their catalog purchases to the “new kid.” A
couple of them, following our inquiries, advised
sotto voce that they believed they must deal
with OCLC out of a loyalty to their profession.
It was a belief akin to loyalty for mom and
apple pie. How respond to such a response?
We were baffled and forced to admit that emotion had trumped reason.
The nature of the new competitor was becoming increasingly clear and presented a quite
different and grave threat not simply on the
grounds of cost of operation but of emotional
appeal. We Argonauts now faced a competitive
threat for which we had no answers arising out
of past experience with competition.
Our firm had a fully-operational facility in
the market-place for cataloging up and running at a competitive price. We were actually
doing everything OCLC claimed to be doing.
We were supporting the catalogs, using both
continued on page 66
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L.C. and Dewey call numbers of libraries not
just in North America but also in Europe and
the Antipodes. Why, we wondered, this duplication of systems expensive to develop and
then to operate, as was the training of skilled
staff? Why the investment in developing a
market costly to develop? Dealing with what
we conceived as an unnecessary duplication
of services readily and as cheaply available,
coupled with its guaranteed financial and operational support, led to the making of a kind
a creature with which we had no experience,
nor could we develop a thesis respecting how
we might deal with it.
Finally, reluctantly cognizant of our empty
intellectual kit bag, we turned to the remaining
option of trying to explore with them common grounds on which our firm might work
cooperatively with OCLC. We tried to open
the door to an exchange of ideas, only to have
our overture rejected. In the next few months
we tried on two further occasions to seek a
meeting. All three of our overtures were cast
off out-of-hand. The sense informing these
refusals rather reminded me of the sense of
the unofficial title used within the group of
several of the university presses prior to the
formation of the American Association of
University Presses: “The Pure Tobacco Growers Association.”
So, the only avenue remaining open to
us was to simply soldier on. This course
demanded that we view the investment in our
system, the costs related to building the supporting database, and the long-term welfare of
a first-rate staff as of markedly reduced value
— in short a substantial loss of corporate value
and the worth of commitments to staff. But
that was the way a substantial gamble had to
be viewed and so substantially depreciated.
So, we had to live with the long-term loss
and proceed with the implementation of other
developmental plans.
While the move to our new, now-completed
Portland quarters in 1970 was very disruptive
for a period of several weeks, thanks to the
excellent planning of the staff we were soon
back up in full operation. Having the entire
operation in a single facility made for a much
smoother and cohesive way of conducting the
business. Staff morale was visibly improved,
thanks to the far better working conditions.
This was the first purpose-designed, new
setting in which to conduct the operations
— a great improvement over the make-shift
arrangements cobbled together in run-down,
cheap quarters, which had marked our history
until then.
The firm had for some months been growing quite rapidly, particularly in the area of
overseas business — both in terms of number
of libraries served and in purchases from
overseas publishers, as increasing numbers
of these libraries had turned to us to supply
books from world-wide sources. Max Gnehm,
together with the managers of our overseas
offices, had succeeded in markedly improving
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the conduct of our overseas operations. This
significant growth volume, and particularly that
of the overseas offices, generated the need for
additional financial muscle. Keith Barker’s
projections of future capital needs forcibly returned management focus to matters financial.
It was now clear that we would be compelled to
take the company public whatever reluctance
might be felt about assuming the burdens,
financial and managerial, that such a move
brought in its train.
We were now approaching the size that
major investment banks minimally demanded.
We selected one of the leading Wall Street
firms as the one we wished to provide advice,
underwrite the public offering, and provide an
after-market for the stock. Following Keith’s
inquiry the bank agreed to accept us as a client. After some months of investigation by
the bank’s underwriting staff, they supplied
a comprehensive plan for the financial way
forward. All of this took the best part of a year.
They lined up a couple of additional funding
sources to provide added bridging financing
until the firm had reached sales of a volume
to support a share offering at $10 per share.
We estimated that we could reach that objective in 1974, which would permit making the
offering in 1975. The plan also advised that
the firm maximize the amount of debt it would
take on. This plan formed the basis for further
negotiation which, when concluded, was to
lead to the signing of an agreement with the
investment bank and the bridging of financing
institutions and the issuance of convertible
bonds to be redeemed by the proceeds from
the share offering.
I went to New York to complete the signing,
which was completed on a Friday. On the flight
back to Portland I was, needless to say, much
preoccupied with what had been done that
day. As I contemplated the repeatedly-proven
historical maxim that things frequently do not
work out the way in which they have been
planned, I became very concerned that things
might go wrong but that no provision had been
made for such a contingency. So, on Saturday
I called the broker with whom we were working and shared my concerns. He suggested
we meet the New York officer handling the
transaction on the following Monday. So, I
flew back on Sunday and went into the bank’s
office on Monday. I again voiced my concerns,
at which the New York officer stood up, pulled
down his vest and announced, “Our firm never
lets down a client.” With that the meeting
ended, and I returned to Portland.
(The reader may well be wondering why
this detailed, and perhaps boring, exposition of
such arcane matters as corporate financial planning rather than matters relating more directly
to library interests. This exercise has been undertaken simply because this protracted event
consumed much management time for the best
part of a year and, more importantly, this plan
set the firm’s management course for the next
several years and established stringent limits
on our financial options henceforward.)
So, confident in the requisite financial
backing, off we went to support the continuing momentum of sales and the continued

forward thrust of services aimed at further assisting libraries in serving their users in more
cost-effective ways. On the collection supply
side we began to offer increasing amounts of
so-called “gray literature” on the Approval
Plan. This initiative was taken on the twin
observations that research libraries were increasingly ordering such fleeting and obscure
material from us and that as the sheer volume
of research findings ballooned-up (witnessed
by the related multiplication of the number of
journal pages required to carry the burgeoning
research results being produced), increasing
numbers of significant research results were
being published neither as books nor as journal
articles but as stand-alone, “gray” publications.
This form of disseminating research results
arose from the fact that such reports were too
brief for books and too lengthy for journal
articles. Further, increasing numbers of such
publications were proprietary publications
often bearing substantial prices and so simply
not generally available through any of the more
typical channels of dissemination.
On the cataloging side we put substantial resources to bear on the cataloging infrastructure
of authority files, which were no longer being
given the support needed to keep collections
coherent. We also well understood that we
had to turn to developing online capabilities,
moving away from punched card input and
access. Given the sheer intractability of the
then main-frame computers, this was not a
negligible undertaking.
Internally and driven by increasing volumes we had to both bring more of the book
and library expertise out in the branch offices
in-house and put them in charge of the various
operating departments supporting the services
we were offering or planned to offer. This
requirement entailed in turn stepping up the
search for and training of prospective branch
managers. We also transferred substantial
amounts of the book “profiling” for the some
95,000 titles now passing through the Approval
Plan to other locations. Thus, “profiling” the
books from the United Kingdom and continental Europe was transferred to the London
office, now under the supervision of Tom
Slatner. A very substantial fraction of the
“profiling” of books published in the United
States was transferred to the New Jersey office under Tom Martin’s supervision. These
moves compelled the locating and training of
other “profilers” — not an easy task. And, of
course, we simply needed more staff, and that
matching the intelligence and dedication of
present staff to support the volume of books
moving through, many of which required the
addition of other components from our “mixand-match” offerings.
In short, management attention and time
had to be much more focused on recruitment
and training of good book people. We had
resolved our long-fraught financial riddle but
now needed to deal with staff matters. We
thought we were making great progress in
the staffing aspect of the development of the
firm — a confidence which was to be shaken
shortly.
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